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A Review of Tariff Rate Quota
Administration in Canadian Agriculture
Richard R. Barichello
To analyze Canada’s Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) administration, a model of efficient quota
administration is put forward. After examining the operation of the Canadian TRQ system for
its twenty-one TRQs, conclusions are drawn. In general this system has worked well in
Canada. The quotas are almost all filled, and the administration is transparent and not costly
for quota-holders to use. Among the international lessons from Canada’s experience are that
few WTO rules may be needed in this area, aside from steps to ensure the TRQ is fully
available to users and can be freely transferred among them.
Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) emerged as an impor-
tant element of the trade policy landscape in the
Uruguay Round Agreement (URA). However,
their operation was largely left to individual coun-
tries to determine. This has led to some dissatis-
faction with how they are working, particularly as
there have been many cases where actual imports
have fallen below the TRQ levels. It is the purpose
of this paper to review the operation of TRQs in
Canada to determine whether the TRQ system has
worked efficiently and as intended, and to see if
any lessons can be drawn to help in guiding the
next round of WTO negotiations,
Three Objectives
Before getting into the details of Canada’s TRQ
regime, I will start by addressing three broad ob-
jectives of TRQ administration. First, and probably
most important from an international trade per-
spective, is the objective of allowing access oppor-
tunities up to the full amount of the TRQ level.
This is how the URA was intended to deal with the
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remaining high tariff and non-tariff barriers that
inhibit trade: by making the TRQs as a small tun-
nel through those barriers. The introduction of
TRQs was a step toward achieving greater open-
ness to trade via additional market access, but only
if the TRQs were fully utilized. (Of course, this
assumes that domestic prices are above world mar-
ket prices due to the existence of trade barriers. If
domestic prices are below world prices, then there
are no binding border protection measures and it is
not desirable to force inefficient imports through
TRQs.)
Second, from a home country perspective of
making the most efficient use of domestic re-
sources, there is the objective of having the lowest
cost or highest revenue firms do the importing. In
other words, we would like to see the TRQs allo-
cated to those firms that can make the best use of
them by generating the highest profits from the
importing activity. Third, it would be desirable that
the system of administration of TRQs is designed
to operate efficiently in that it does not unneces-
sarily waste the country’s resources.
An Efficient TRQ Administration Model
Given these objectives, we now describe what
would constitute an efficient regime for adminis-
tering TRQs, by discussing the means for achiev-
ing each objective.
Full Utilization of TRQ
To ensure full use of the TRQ, many models and
procedures could be followed. The full use of
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TRQs has two aspects: the aggregate TRQ for a
country should be fully allocated to importing en-
tities (firms), and the entities receiving TRQs
should fully use their allocation. (This assumes that
some quota is imposed. Alternative access mecha-
nisms like first-come, first-served (FCFS) with no
prior allocation or simply applying a tariff, mecha-
nisms with no quantitative restrictions, are not be-
ing considered as true TRQs here.) For the first
aspect, the main means of assuring full utilization
is for the administering agency to fully distribute
import quotas to importers, and to do so relatively
early in the quota period. Other rules for operating
the TRQ administrative system must be designed
to facilitate a full, rapid and transparent distribu-
tion of the quota.
For the second aspect, there are many means of
ensuring that importers holding the quota make full
use of it. In a market economy, one would wish to
preserve the profit motive for importers so that
they would import the item in question as long as
domestic prices are higher than world prices by
more than the cost of importation. This can be
accomplished by having private firms receive the
import quotas. It can also be accomplished by al-
lowing firms to compete to obtain these import
rights. The general point here is that the TRQ sys-
tem should involve many importers and not create
a situation where there is a monopoly importer.
Similarly, allowing quotas to be rented out or
rented in, or bought and sold openly, will create
strong incentives for the firms that obtain the quo-
tas to use them fully. The application of carefully
constructed additional regulations can also
strengthen the incentives for firms to make full use
of their quotas. One example is the widely ob-
served rule for all types of quota systems, for the
quota holder to “use it or lose it.” Such a regulation
removes quota from quota holders if they do not
use some high percentage of their quota. Whether
such added regulations are necessary is a separate
question, but most countries seem to believe so
because this type of regulation is almost universal
across and within countries.
TRQs Allocated to Firms That Make Best Use
of Them
The second objective is to ensure that those im-
porters receiving the quota are the most efficient
importers in terms of net profit (lowest costs, high-
est revenues). One widely suggested method of
achieving this is to use quota auctions to allocate
the TRQ. (Although this allocation mechanism is
economically efficient, there may be legal WTO
issues that inhibit its use. The fee that is paid in
such an auction, although it is bid by the would-be
buyer, could be seen as a breach of the tariff bind-
ing, the in-quota tariff in this case, and that fee is
not related to the cost of import service,) Alloca-
tion by auction will result in those firms that make
the highest net importing profit acquiring the
quota. However, other methods can achieve this
same end. One effective but overlooked mecha-
nism is to allow quota resale and transfer, However
the quota is initially allocated, if there is a well-
developed (and legal !) market in quota for resale
and transfer, a firm that is unlikely to utilize its
quota fully can sell it and realize the quota profits.
In the process the quota passes along to a firm that
will necessarily use it to recoup the costs of buying
it. The point is often lost, that resale provisions will
result in the quota ending up in the same hands
(i.e., that it is as economically efficient) as with an
auction. This point has practical importance be-
cause many jurisdictions find some reason for not
allowing quota transfer and sale.
Efficient TRQ Operating System
The third objective is to have efficient quota ad-
ministration and regulations. This can be accom-
plished most effectively by following a basic rule
in regulating quota use, and that is to keep the
regulatory system as simple as possible. All firms
(existing ones or newcomers) should be allowed to
acquire the quota; there is no reason for limiting
the quota validity period (i.e., they should be able
to use the quota whenever they wish within the
quota period); and buying and renting should be
fine for all firms of whatever size or with whatever
facilities. Put differently, the rules need only to say
which commodity item can be imported (HS num-
ber) and that imports must be made by the end of
the quota period. The temptation to use the quota
regulatory system to meet other objectives should
be resisted.
Another way to keep the quota administration
system as simple as possible is to minimize the
uncertainty and rule changes associated with the
regime. Even if there are a number of rules, if these
rules are transparent, well publicized and not
changed too often, the uncertainty factor facing
quota users is substantially reduced. This is par-
ticularly an issue in developing countries where
quota regimes are often characterized by little in-
formation and a complete lack of transparency and
openness, usually to facilitate corruption of various
types.
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concerns the general question of the distribution of
quota rents and whether the recipient should pay
for the quota. (Note the possible legal issues sur-
rounding any payment for the quota, beyond the
in-quota tariff and a cost of service, as mentioned
above.) It may be judged desirable to tax away
some of the profits (quota rents) accruing to quota
holders, This can be done effectively and com-
pletely by an auction, but it can also be done less
thoroughly by imposing a charge to acquire the
quota. This can have the advantage of generating
some public revenue as well as leaving some prof-
its in the hands of the quota recipient (although
reducing those profits by the amount taxed by this
charge), And the charge can be infinitely varied to
achieve any desired split in revenues (quota rents)
between the quota recipients and the treasury. One
disadvantage of such a charge system is the diffi-
culty in knowing, at least at the outset, what to
charge. Observations on the transfer price prevail-
ing in private transactions can be a guide to the
total rents and to an appropriate charge to levy on
initial allocations.
One advantage of both these payment schemes
is that they have the effect of reducing rent seeking
or corruption by those wishing to obtain the quotas.
Rent seeking induced by a quota allocation scheme
can make the system very inefficient in terms of
the waste of time and money spent in lobbying,
especially when quota values are high. This can be
reduced or prevented by making the receipt of quo-
tas less lucrative by auctioning them or charging a
fee for them that is close to the auction price. In
addition, rent-seeking can be reduced by keeping
the quota allocation system rules-based, with clear
reallocation criteria and a mechanical reallocation
process with no scope for case-by-case adjust-
ments or individual judgments. (Keeping the sys-
tem rules-based is still consistent with imposing
penalties that may result in quota reallocations for
behavior by quota holders considered undesirable
by quota administrators. The key issue is that these
penalties be specified in advance and not discre-
tionary,)
Another way to make the quota system work
more efficiently is to define two types of quota—
permanent and annual. TRQs are usually valid for
only one year. In some cases, it may be more ef-
ficient for a firm to own the quota outright, so that
the amount of quota the firm will have in future
years is known with certainty. This can be accom-
plished by defining a permanent quota, according
to which the firm would receive the annual import
rights every year in perpetuity (subject to the pos-
sible future demise of the regime, of course, and
subject to” use it or lose it” provisions). This is the
type of quota used to limit farm production in most
supply management regimes in Canada. Yet to
have only such a “permanent” quota is less effi-
cient than giving the permanent quota owner the
flexibility of being able to rent out (or in) of some
permanent quota from year to year. In other words,
an efficient quota system will involve both perma-
nent quota (for acquisition for long-term reasons)
and one-year quota or the rental of permanent
quota (for short-term reasons of fluctuating mar-
kets and general flexibility). Designers and man-
agers of such schemes can draw on the experience
of TRQ administration for short-term, one-year
rental arrangements and on the experience associ-
ated with farm marketing quotas for long-term,
permanent quota arrangements,
Issues Surrounding TRQ Systems
A number of other issues regarding TRQ systems,
including Canada’s, are worth discussing here.
These issues concern the efficiency of the quota
administrative system, the profitability (size of
quota rents) of the export opportunities opened up
or restricted by the TRQ, and the equity of quota
allocations. This allocation issue is not so much
about which entities within Canada receive import
rights, but which countries gain the right to export
into Canada through the TRQs.
Five issues are addressed, How aggregated are
TRQ commitments, and at what level of commod-
ity aggregation are TRQs administered? Second,
should TRQs be targeted partly or completely to
specific countries’ exports (“country reserves”)?
Third, should state trading enterprises (STES) be
handling or be the recipient of TRQs? Fourth,
should impo~ allocations be restricted to industry
segments, establishments, and product end-uses?
And fifth, are there administrative matters concern-
ing handling the TRQs, such as validity periods
and unfilled quota provisions, that lead to fewer
imports or lower-valued imports that lower the
value of the TRQ to the exporting country? Finally,
there is some confusion about whether a problem
in the eyes of an exporter is due to Canada’s TRQ
implementation system or to the negotiated access
and commitments agreed upon in the UR. One
such example would be the debate about tariff
peaks, which is not a TRQ issue per se, and will
not be discussed here. Another is the actual level of
the TRQ, which was also negotiated and is now
exogenous and not an issue of TRQ administration.
On the subject of aggregation, to maximize the
value of the TRQs one would like to see commit-
ments defined as broad aggregates and adminis-106 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
tered similarly. However, if the TRQ is defined
broadly (e.g., “eggs”), yet in terms of administra-
tion it can be used only to import processed eggs,
not table eggs, the tariff will be valid only for
low-valued egg products. This mix of commitment
and administration detail effectively reduces the
market access of the TRQ. To maximize the value
of market access for a given TRQ, the commitment
should be made across a broad commodity cat-
egory, without further administrative constraint,
and the trade should determine which products to
import within that broad commodity category.
The country reserve or preferential trade issue is
really one of equity in distribution of TRQs among
different countries’ exports. But limiting a TRQ to
a specific country’s exports lowers the value of the
TRQ compared with allowing any country’s ex-
ports under that quota, as in the previously dis-
cussed case. Of the 21 TRQs administered by
Canada for agricultural commodities, five have
some kind of partial or complete country reserve
(cheese to the EU, butter to New Zealand, pow-
dered buttermilk to New Zealand, condensed milk
to Australia, and beef and veal to Australia and
New Zealand). Certain country allocations existed
prior to the URA, and these were continued to
ensure that those countries would not lose as a
result of Canada’s URA commitments under the
UR guidelines for establishing current access com-
mitments.
The matter of STES handling TRQs remains
contentious. One argument is that the STE, often
less influenced by market considerations, may
have no incentive to fill the TRQ. A simple statis-
tical correlation, as done by the WTO Secretariat in
June 1998, may show that state trading enterprises
fill their TRQs as completely as other recipients of
TRQ allocations. Although it may be more likely
that STES do not have the incentive to fill their
TRQs, in an actual situation this depends on the
specific incentives faced by the firm, agency, or
STE. That kind of detail is not available in simple
correlations, and so this approach offers an incom-
plete test of STE behavior in general in filling
TRQs.
Another complaint is that the STE, especially if
it represents producer interests, will choose to limit
the TRQ to lower valued imports within that cat-
egory or to pay the exporter lower prices for the
good in question than would be paid under a pri-
vate market transaction. Therefore, the argument
goes, allocating TRQs to STES is likely to reduce
the market access represented by that quota, either
quantitatively or in value terms, Canada has one
case of an STE holding a TRQ in which the Ca-
nadian Dairy Commission receives the butter TRQ.
New Zealand has complained that this arrangement
has reduced the prices it can receive for its butter
exports to Canada. This complaint covers two is-
sues, the general potential of an STE to lower the
value of its TRQ, and the specific use of a policy
directive to import New Zealand butter for pro-
cessing, not retail, use.
In answer to the fourth question, about restrict-
ing import allocations to industry segments, estab-
lishments, and product end-uses, this will also re-
duce the value of the market access represented by
the TRQ, In effect, such restrictions reduce the
demand for those imports, compared with unre-
stricted, open-market allocation of those imports.
Although this restriction puts allocations into the
hands of those who will use it, the recipients are
willing to pay less to get the allocation than others
would be. If not, the restriction would be unnec-
essary. Consequently, this type of restriction has
the same effects as do country reserves and, argu-
ably, allocating TRQs to state traders. Any restric-
tions on who can use or receive TRQs will reduce
the demand for and lower the implicit value of that
TRQ, to the disadvantage of would-be exporters.
There are several examples of this kind of TRQ
allocation in Canada. It has usually arisen for his-
torical reasons, where pre-URA end-use alloca-
tions have been preserved in the current TRQ al-
locations.
With regard to administrative restrictions in han-
dling of TRQs, such as limited validity periods for
the quota and unfilled quota provisions, the tighter
those restrictions, the more costly it is to comply
and the lower the demand for TRQ imports. This
could lead to fewer or lower-valued imports, or
simply to a reduction in import quota rents (or in
the implicit value to the importing country of the
TRQ). This situation will harm the importing coun-
try as much as the exporting country and is dis-
cussed in the previous section under efficiency of
TRQ administrative arrangements.
The Canadian TRQ System
In Canada, jurisdiction for imports, like all ele-
ments of international trade, falls to the federal
government. The administration of tariff rate quo-
tas since 1995 has been undertaken by the Export
and Import Controls Bureau (EICB) of the Depart-
ment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
(DFAIT), which also was previously responsible
for the administration of all import quotas, In keep-
ing with this continuity in jurisdiction, the shift in
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gime to the current TRQ system has been smooth
and largely seamless.
The firms that receive import allocations (or
“quota-shares”) are mostly private, with the post-
1995 exception that a state enterprise, the Canadian
Dairy Commission (CDC), is the sole organization
that will ordinarily be granted import permits for
butter by the EICB. Import allocations are decided
upon annually. The property right to this quota,
year after year, is weak in strictly legal terms, but
there has been a great deal of continuity in alloca-
tions over the years. There has also been consid-
erable variation in the number of holders of import
permits or allocations across dairy products. In
1991, for example, there were 237 quota holders
for cheese, 33 for ice cream, 28 for yogurt, 1 for
buttermilk, and 1 for evaporated and condensed
milk (Canadian International Trade Tribunal
1992).
TRQs have been handled in much the same way
as were the previous import quotas, The number of
quota holders by product has not changed appre-
ciably, although now there is a TRQ for butter
(held by the CDC) whereas before there was no
specific import quota. Many regulations for obtain-
ing and using the quotas are the same as in the
pre-1995 period. There are now twenty-one TRQs
in Canada.
Current Procedures
The procedures that are now followed can be sum-
marized across commodities in terms of which
firms are likely to be given priority in TRQ allo-
cations and what restrictions must be followed. In
general, new entrants are heavily discriminated
against in Canada, although there are cases (e.g.,
chicken) where there is a gradual shift away from
historical allocations. For TRQ allocations, some
commodities emphasize historical importers and
firms with established operations and distribution
lines, Sometimes allocations are proportional to
production or sales, and sometimes an allocation
depends upon specific component needs in the pro-
duction process, In other cases, TRQs are allocated
on a first come, first served basis. Almost always
there is an adjustment for any previous quota left
unfilled. “Use it or lose it” is the rule almost uni-
versally applied, with an allowance for sufficient
prior notification to the administering agency.
There are some size restrictions per company for
the holding allowed, and some Canadian residency
conditions.
No financial element is involved in the quota
allocation process between quota recipients and the
administering agency. In other words, there is no
auctioning and no charge for a quota allocation.
Therefore, it is still a policy decision that all quota
rents accrue to the recipient of the quota. Some
commodity rules still do not allow rentals or inter-
firm quota transfers, but in most cases quotas can
be rented and sold, a change from the situation in
1991,
Pe~ormance of TRQ Regime in Terms of Fill
Rates for TRQ
Another aspect of Canada’s TRQ regime is the
extent to which TRQ levels have been filled by
actual imports, In general, the percentage is close
to 100% across all categories. Therefore, the situ-
ation in Canada is generally unlike that in many
other country jurisdictions where there have been
problems of “underfdling” TRQs. This appears in
part to be the natural outcome of vesting the TRQs
in private hands, outside the farm production side
of the industry where there is a commercial incen-
tive to import the products in question, Another
observation is that there are available import per-
mits, supplementary to the TRQs (and outside
TRQ access), for those processing firms wishing to
import dairy raw materials or products, manufac-
ture or further process other dairy products, and
export them internationally. Imports for re-export
are outside the TRQ system and are not counted as
part of Canada’s fill.
We have data for 1995 to 1998 for all twenty-
one products or product categories (beef, poultry/
eggs, dairy products, a close dairy substitute (mar-
garine), and wheat/barley) that fall under the juris-
diction of the Export and Import Controls Bureau
on the TRQ levels and actual quantities imported.
All categories are reviewed below. Ignoring the
open wheat/barley category, for 1997 there are
only four cases where TRQs are not virtually 100~0
filled: yogurt (88% filled), heavy cream (63%), dry
whey (83$ZO), and margarine (1.6%). In 1998, there
are two such cases: heavy cream (83%), and mar-
garine (6%). There are no data for liquid milk, for
which Canada’s TRQ is 64,500 tons, due to the
unique means of dealing with this TRQ which al-
lows individual cross-border shoppers to import
the product subject to the conditions which applied




Canada had a TRQ of 6348.8 tons of margarine in
1998, rising to 7558 tons in the year 2000. In 1998,108 April 2000 Agricultural and Resource Economics Review
actual imports under the TRQ were 404.43 tons,
indicating a fill rate of only 6.4Y0. This might ap-
pear to indicate that protective or overly rigid mea-
sures are being practiced in the implementation of
this TRQ in order to restrict margarine imports, but
there are no indications that this is the case. The
TRQ is administered on a first-come, first-served
basis. Since the establishment of the tariff quota,
all requests for imports have been granted. There
are no restrictions on access to these permits, other
than a 500 ton limit per applicant, and that has been
raised from 200 tons per applicant, Further in-
creases in that level have not yet been requested.
The only imports are specialty spreads.
It is most likely that domestic margarine produc-
tion in Canada is highly competitive with imports
to the extent that general margarine imports into
Canada are not profitable. This is not surprising,
given that Canada is an exporter of canola, a major
ingredient in margarine production, and hence
canola is available relatively cheaply within the
country. All oilseeds can also be imported without
duty. Furthermore, this low fill rate for the marga-
rine TRQ has persisted over the TRQ period.
Broiler Hatching Eggs and Chicks
The quota level for broiler hatching eggs and
chicks has been arranged in a bilateral agreement
between Canada and the U,S. at 21.1% of the cur-
rent year’s estimated domestic production. This
level has been split into two separate access com-
mitments for eggs (17.4%) and chicks (3,7Yo). The
TRQ level under the WTO is 7.9 million dozen in
egg equivalents (one chick equals 1.27 hatching
eggs). The larger of these percentages is applied to
arrive at the TRQ each year.
Individual quotas are allocated to federally reg-
istered hatcheries on the basis of market share
(production), with appropriate downward adjust-
ments for any hatchery’s underutilization of the
previous year’s quota. There is the opportunity to
grant supplemental quota to deal with market
shortages. However, application for supplement-
al must be made to the EICB, which consults with
the Canadian Broiler Hatching Egg Marketing
Agency, the national agency representing all pro-
vincial producer marketing boards, to determine
whether there is domestic product available and
hence whether a market shortage exists, Supple-
mental imports can also be granted to allow for
re-exports.
The fill rate for this TRQ appears to have been
in excess of 10070 in each of the last four years
since the TRQ was established in 1995. In 1998,
actual imports were 175% of the WTO TRQ level,
and in 1997 actual imports were 132?L0 of the WTO
TRQ level. However, the NAFTA commitment ex-
ceeds the WTO quota so the larger level of imports
are actually allowed, and the fill rate relative to the
(smaller) WTO quota looks to be in excess of
100%. Properly measured, the fill rates are ap-
proximately 100%.
Shell Eggs
Canada’s import quota under the FTA and NAFTA
for table eggs and egg products was agreed to at
2.988% of the previous year’s domestic produc-
tion, split among shell eggs (1.65%), egg products
such as frozen, liquid, and further processed eggs
(0,71%), and powdered eggs (0.63%). For 1999
this is equivalent to 13.318 million dozen. The
WTO commitment established a TRQ level of
19.66 million dozen for 1999, which was about 5$10
of the base year, The higher access level between
these two quotas is applied, and since 1996 this has
been the WTO commitment.
For both shell eggs and egg products, the quota
is allocated to historical (pre-1974) importers of
shell eggs and egg products who keep their initial
allocation minus any adjustments for underuse.
The remainder of the quota for these two catego-
ries of imports is allocated to registered egg sta-
tions (shell eggs) and processors, wholesalers, and
distributors (for egg products) on the basis of their
market share. The quota for powdered eggs is al-
located on a modified first-come, first-served basis
to registered processed-egg stations and further
processors that use powdered eggs in their manu-
facturing processes, adjusted for previous un-
deruse. A new allocation for nest-run eggs for
breaking purposes (i.e., ungraded shell eggs) was
introduced in 1996 for the increase in import ac-
cess that occurred under Canada’s larger WTO ac-
cess commitment. This is allocated each year to
registered processed egg stations on a market share
basis, with the usual adjustment for underuse.
This latter allocation has been contentious be-
cause all the increased market access agreed to
under the WTO goes to egg imports for breaking
purposes, with none of the access going to the
higher-priced shell-egg market. This is an example
of an end-use quota restriction that has denied
WTO import access to higher-valued portions of
the egg market by preserving that market for do-
mestic producers, but one that Canada has vigor-
ously defended.
A supplementary quota scheme exists for the
usual two reasons: to prevent shortages of shell
eggs or egg products, and to allow imports of eggs
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this quota (for the former reason) involves making
application to the EICB, which consults with the
Canadian Egg Marketing Agency, the national
agency that oversees the activities of the provincial
producer marketing boards, to determine whether a
shortage exists or whether there is domestic prod-
uct available.
The fill rate of Canada’s egg TRQ has been
close to or above 1009o since 1995. In the last two
years, 1997 and 1998, the fill rates were 120% and
132Y0,respectively, on an egg-equivalent basis, al-
though these numbers include supplementary per-
mits.
Chicken
The quota level for chicken also differs between
the FTAfNAFTA and the WTO. Under NAFTA,
the agreed quota level was 7.570 of the previous
year’s domestic production. The WTO commit-
ment has been 39,844 tons (eviscerated product
basis) for both 1997 and 1998. Due to continuing
growth in the domestic market, the access level
under NAFTA has been higher and consistently
applied since 1995.
The method of allocating this quota was revised
in 1996, and it has now become quite complex.
Three groups receive quota. First, any firms, re-
gardless of their end use, who imported chicken
prior to 1979 receive their initial allocation, ad-
justed for underuse. Second, processors of chicken
products that are not on the Import Control List,
and who hence must compete with imports that
have open access to the Canadian market, receive
enough quota (“F’TA quota”) to cover their “needs”
but they must satisfy an “activity” test. Firms in the
food services sector receive a share (5.6%, or 2.7
million kgs.) of the TRQ remaining, depending
upon the firm’s market share. Finally, the remain-
der of the TRQ is split 70:30 between chicken
processors (on the basis of market share) and
chicken distributors (on the basis of equal shares).
Any firm with a historical share can opt (irrevers-
ibly) for a market share or equal share, depending
upon whether they are a processor or food services
firm, or a distributor, respectively. There are mini-
mum “threshold levels” for firms to qualify for
quota in these various categories, with some pro-
vision for minimum quota allotments for small op-
erations. Firms with historical quota shares are
subject to use-it-or-lose-it provisions.
Supplemental quota is available under four cat-
egories: when there are shortages in the Canadian
market; for firms who need imports destined for
reexport; for firms who wish to test-market new
products or processes; and to allow further proces-
sors to compete with imports. Requests for quota
for the first category (shortages) must be made to
the EICB, which consults with the Chicken Farm-
ers of Canada who determine whether domestic
supplies are available for that use. For the other
three categories, supplementary permits are issued
on request. It should be noted that there are no
country reserves within the chicken quotas.
The fill rates for the chicken TRQ have been at
100% since 1995. In 1997 and 1998, the fill rates
were calculated as 13990 and 146Y0, respectively,
but this was due to the fact that NAFTA quota
levels are higher than the WTO quota levels used
as the basis for the TRQ fill rate calculations. How-
ever, it is also true that the market for chicken,
particularly for further processed categories, has
been growing quickly, and supplemental quota al-
locations (above the TRQ) have been common.
Turkeys
The FTA/NAFTA quota level for turkey was
equivalent to 3.570 of the current year’s estimated
production. Under the WTO, the TRQ level nego-
tiated for 1999 was 5.4 million kgs. (on an evis-
cerated-product basis), and for 1999 the expected
WTO access level was slightly larger and therefore
dominant, The WTO quota has incorporated a
growth factor since it was defined, growing by
20% from 1995 to 1999. As in the cases of the
other poultry quotas, there are no country reserves.
These import quotas have been allocated to two
groups. First, there are fourteen traditional or his-
torical (pre-1974) importers, and, as in the cases
above, they receive their initial allocations, ad-
justed downward for any underutilization. Second,
there are Non-Import Control List or FTA Quota-
holders for firms producing products like potpies,
soups, and TV dinners. They receive quota “to the
extent of their needs,” as quoted in the regulations.
New entrants can qualify here, based on their pro-
duction in the previous year. Remaining unallo-
cated quota is allocated in the first six months of
the year for special requests. The provisions for
supplemental permits are based on the usual four
categories: to cover domestic market shortages,
imports for reexports, test-marketing of new prod-
ucts, and for “further processors” who need raw
turkey imports so that they can compete with fur-
ther-processed turkey imports. Requests for
supplemental quota in the category of “shortages”
must be made to the EICB after the producer
agency, the Canadian Turkey Marketing Agency,
has attempted to find sources of domestic product.
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quota is allocated to historical quota holders on a fluid milk TRQ has been challenged by the U.S.,
pro-rata basis. but a WTO Panel appeal judgment earlier this year
Regarding TRQ fill rates, the turkey TRQ has accepted the procedure and removed the $20 limit.
been filled since its inception in 1995. In 1995 the Because there is no formal counting of fluid milk
fill rate was 105%, in 1996 it was marginally be- imported by individual consumers, no published
low 100%, in 1997 it was 101%, and in 1998 the notifications are made and we cannot verify the fill
fill rate was 103.370. rate.
Beef and Veal Heavy Cream
Although there is free trade between Canada and
the U.S. under the FTA/NAFTA, Canada has a
TRQ commitment under the WTO. It has agreed to
a TRQ for non-NAFTA countries (except Chile) in
the amount of 76,409 tons for fresh, chilled, and
frozen beef and veal. The TRQ does incorporate
two country reserves, for New Zealand and Aus-
tralia, with the New Zealand share of the total
quota at 29,600 tons and the Australia share at
35,000 tons. The remaining amount, 11,809 tons, is
open to all other countries.
The beef TRQ is allocated to importers in two
pools, one for processors and retailer-processors,
and one for distributors. The former pool, of
57,307 tons, is allocated based on the amount of
beef and veal from countries other than the U.S.,
Mexico, and Chile processed in these processors’
own facilities from November 1 to October 31 of
the previous year. The second pool, of 19,102 tons,
is allocated to distributors based on sales of beef
and veal from countries other than the U. S.,
Mexico, and Chile, from November 1 to October
31 of the previous year, A system of supplemen-
tary quotas has been implemented to deal with
market shortages.
The beef and veal TRQ has been filled or virtu-
ally so in all years since 1995. In 1995 the fill rate
was 1139t0,in 1996 the rate was 9’7.4~0, in 1997 it
was 117%, and in 1998 it was 11l?ZO.
Fluid Milk
In the case of fluid milk, Canada has a TRQ of
64,500 tons. This is a global TRQ, accessible by
any country supplier, but in practice, due to trans-
portation costs, it is likely to be filled only from the
U.S. This TRQ is unique in that Canada does not
allocate it to any importer, but leaves its importa-
tion to individual residents of Canada who shop in
the U.S. and choose to bring fluid milk home, Un-
der General Import Permit #1, “any resident of
Canada may import up to $20 worth of dairy prod-
ucts, including fluid milk and cream, for the per-
sonal use of the importer and his household. This
General Import Permit may be invoked an unlim-
ited number of times.” This method of handling the
This is a relatively small TRQ, with Canada’s ac-
cess commitment at only 394 tons. It is a global
TRQ, and by its product description applies to
cream in excess of 690 fat without added sweeten-
ing and not concentrated. The scheduled commit-
ment, and therefore TRQ, is restricted to sterilized
cream with a minimum 23% butterfat in cans of
volume not exceeding 200 ml. and to “specialty
creams.”
The allocation of this TRQ is on a modified
first-come, first-served basis. Allocations are also
made to certain firms and lines of business, with
“priority to importers with established distribution
lines for specialty creams.” Any remaining balance
in the TRQ can be allocated, upon application, to
other firms that can demonstrate they have in place
a distribution line for specialty creams.
In the administration of this TRQ, companies
that cannot fill their quotas are not allowed to
transfer the unutilized part of their quota to another
user. But any such unused quota is allocated to
other would-be importers on a first come, first
served basis, so the allocation system is still quite
open; transfers are effectively made through the
EICB. Firms who turn in unused parts of their TRQ
retain their TRQ without penalty for the next
year’s allocation.
This TRQ is quite unique among Canada’s ag-
ricultural TRQs in that, like margarine, it has not
been completely filled in any of its years of opera-
tion since 1995. Its fill rates since 1995 have been
77%, 80%, 63%, and in the marketing year 1998/
1999, 83%.
Concentrated and Condensed MilWCream
The TRQ level for this small category is 11.7 tons,
and it has not changed since 1995. However, this
TRQ is allocated entirely to one traditional or his-
torical importer, and can be sourced only from
Australia. The reason for this situation is that Aus-
tralia was the sole supplying country when this
item was placed on the Import Control List.
This TRQ has been completely filled in each of
the four years from 1995 to 1998, at 100910,100%,
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Yogurt
Canada’s WTO commitments for yogurt have re-
sulted in a TRQ of 332 tons, a quota that has stayed
constant in size since 1995. It is a global quota,
without restriction on country suppliers.
This TRQ has been allocated to historical im-
porters, regardless of their sector of activity. The
quota amount is made in proportion to each im-
porter’s historical imports. Underutilization penal-
ties do apply, and any quota obtained through these
penalties is made available to historical and new
importers who make application, without other re-
striction.
This TRQ has been somewhat underfilled over
the period since 1995, although the fill rate has
been increasing each year to 100% in the last year.
Its pattern of fill has been the following: 1995,
729io; 1996, 86%; 1997, 88%; and 1998, 100%.
Powdered Buttermilk
Canada’s WTO commitment in the case of pow-
dered buttermilk is a TRQ of 980 tons that has
stayed constant over the period from 1995 to date.
Unlike yogurt, however, it is not a global commit-
ment; rather, the supplying country is New Zealand
for the full TRQ allotment. Furthermore, the TRQ
is allocated to one historical importer. The reason
for this country reserve is the same as for Australia
and condensed milk, that when powdered butter-
milk was placed on the Import Control List, New
Zealand was the traditional and sole supplier, and
this arrangement rolled over into the WTO com-
mitments,
The administrative arrangements are standard,
including that the importer is subject to a use-it-
or-lose-it restriction on the TRQ. However, the im-
porter has completely filled this TRQ in each year
since 1995. The fill rates have been 1995, 116Yo;
1996, 133%; 1997, 101%; and 1998, 120%.
Dry Whey
This product has a TRQ of 3198 tons. Its level has
been constant since 1995 and can be sourced from
any country. The allocation of the dry or powdered
whey TRQ is on a modified first-come, first-served
basis. Allocations are made to specific firms whose
use of this product conforms to certain end-use
conditions. Priority is given to users of specialty
wheys not available from domestic sources who
can show that specialty wheys are required in their
manufacturing or product formulations. Any re-
maining TRQ, after the needs of this first group are
met, is allocated to processors and further proces-
sors who can show a requirement for whey in their
manufacturing process. Again, any unused quota
from one firm cannot be transferred directly to an-
other firm, but rather should be turned into the
Export and Import Controls Branch who reallocate
to other users on a first come, first served basis.
The fill rates on this TRQ have been highly vari-
able. In 1995 the rate was 669io.It increased to full
usage in 1996 (1019io), fell to 83% in 1997, then
rebounded to 160% in 1998/1999.
Products of Natural Milk Constituents
The TRQ for this category of products is 4345
tons, a level that has been constant since 1995.
This TRQ can be sourced from any country and is
allocated on a modified first-come, first-served ba-
sis. However, its allocation is to firms that have
certain manufacturing characteristics, just as in the
case for dry whey, discussed above. Priority goes
to users of milk protein concentrate who can show
they need this product in their manufacturing or
product formulations. The remainder of this TRQ
is allocated to processors and further processors
who can demonstrate a need for these products in
their manufacturing and production processes. The
usual administrative requirements apply, such as
the use-it-or-lose it condition.
This TRQ started out being often unfilled, but
each year its usage has increased, to 10070 fill rates
in the years 1997 and 1998. However, in 1995 the
fill rate was only 4690, and in 1996 it was 67910,
Butter
As one of the most protected of Canada’s dairy
products, butter had been on the Import Control
List for forty years with the Canadian Dairy Com-
mission as the sole importer. In most years prior to
1995, there were no butter imports. When butter
was imported, it was only to relieve a temporary
market shortage. In 1995, as part of Canada’s UR
commitments, a TRQ for butter was initiated, with
a growth factor built in and with a country reserve
for New Zealand. The level of the TRQ for 1995
was 1,964 tons, increasing to 3,274 tons in 2000.
Of this, New Zealand’s reserve started at 1,200
tons (61 %) of the 1,964 tons in 1995, increasing to
2,000 tons (61 %) of Canada’s total 3,274 tons in
the year 2000. This level accounts for less than 3~0
of Canada’s base-period butter consumption.
This TRQ has been fully allocated by the EICB
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agency that oversees dairy policy in Canada and
which is a state trading enterprise by virtue of its
right as the sole importer of butter. The further
allocation of this quota is restricted to use only by
processors and further processors. As noted earlier,
this allocation of the butter quota to the CDC has
been contentious, with New Zealand complaining
that it has received lower export prices for its but-
ter than would otherwise be the case.
The TRQ has been filled in each year since 1995
with a fill rate of 100% in the 1995, 1996, 1997,
and 1998 dairy marketing years.
Cheese
A cheese import quota was introduced in 1975 at
50 million pounds, which was reduced to 45 mil-
lion pounds (20,41 2 tons) in 1978. There was then
an agreement between Canada and the European
Union for a country reserve. The current EU share
(since 1996) is 66%, with the remainder open to
imports from all other countries. The TRQ estab-
lished for cheese under the URA was fixed at this
same level of 20,412 tons until 1999 and beyond.
In addition, the country reserve to the UE was
incorporated into the administration of Canada’s
cheese TRQ. It is the view of some industry ex-
perts that the EU reserve produces a result that is
not that different from what the pattern of imports
would be with open markets, and therefore would
arguably be consistent with GATT 1994 Arti-
cle 13.
A large number of private cheese importers have
been actively involved in the cheese trade for many
years and have retained their rights to annual al-
lotments of this TRQ since 1995. Regardless of
what sector of activity they are engaged in, these
historical importers still receive their traditional al-
lotment, as long as they remain active in the cheese
trade and as long as they utilize at least 95% of
their import allocation. These TRQs can be bought
and sold among cheese-trade participants, includ-
ing newcomers. In fact, there has been enough
trade in these quotas that 7270 of current cheese
quota holders have entered the cheese trading sys-
tem since 1985. There is also a provision for
supplemental quotas for market shortages and for
reexport, but these allocations are rare.
As far as fill rates are concerned, cheese quotas
have been filled in each of the four years since
1995, at 100% until 1997, and at 101% in 1998.
Other Dairy Products
This category is for food preparations that contain
more than 10910 by weight of milk solids, packaged
for the wholesale and industrial trade. The TRQ is
set for 70 tons and is open to all countries. The
quota is allocated to those who apply, and there is
a requirement that quota holders are users of these
food preparations and can show a need for these
products in their manufacturing and product for-
mulations. This quota has always been filled, usu-
ally at a fill rate considerably above 100910,In the
four years from 1995 to 1998, the fill rate has been
100%, 310910, 224Y0, and 197% respectively, re-
flecting issuance of supplementary permits.
Ice Cream
This product was only named to the Import Control
List in 1988, but then placed under a TRQ like all
other agricultural products in 1995. The TRQ level
was initially 347 tons, rising by 1999 to 456.6 tons.
It is open to all countries and has no restrictions on
the types of importing firms that receive the quota.
The TRQ is allocated to historical importers,
regardless of their sector of activity, in proportion
to their historical imports. Underutilization penal-
ties apply if imports fall below 90% of the import-
er’s allocation, and such quota is reallocated peri-
odically to those who apply, new or traditional
importers, without restriction.
The fill rate on this quota has been quite high
and steadily rising to more than 10070. In 1995 it
was 89Y0, in 1996 it was 99Y0, in 1997 it was
104%, and in 1998 it was 121%, even though there
was a growth factor in the TRQ.
Wheat, Barley and Their Products
There are four TRQs under this category, and they
are items not under supply management regimes,
The items are wheat, barley, wheat products, and
barley products, The TRQ levels for 1998/99 were:
wheat, 190,582 tons; barley, 335,160 tons; wheat
products, 123,557 tons on a grain-equivalent basis;
and barley products, 16,070 tons on a grain-
equivalent basis. In addition to these quota levels,
under NAFTA provisions Mexican wheat, barley,
and their products can still enter at the within-
quota tariff rates, even if the TRQ is full. The same
applies to the U.S. for wheat and wheat products,
and now also for barley products.
TRQs for these grains and products are available
to importers from the U.S. and Chile on a first-
come, first-served basis. Revenue Canada, Cana-
da’s customs and income tax department, keeps
track of the volumes, and once the TRQ level is
reached, the over-TRQ tariff then applies. Initially,
importers need General Import Permit No. 20 and
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these GIP permits (both No. 20 and No. 100) is
required. After the TRQ is filled, General Import
Permit No. 100 is necessary, and this covers un-
limited imports, but all such imports pay the higher
over-TRQ rates of duty, There is, in addition, a
supplementary access regime to cover the situation
of market shortages. Importers make application
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs considers the
availability of “like or directly substitutable” prod-
ucts on the Canadian market in making the deci-
sion to grant supplemental permits.
Fill rates are quite variable within these grain
categories, The fill rates for the wheat TRQ in the
four marketing years from 1995/1996 to 1998/
1999 were 18, 74, 27, and 331%0, respectively, For
barley over the same four years fill rates were 5,
31, 12, and 18%. For wheat products the TRQ was
always filled, with fill rates of 114, 100, 110, and
102%. For barley products the fill rates were 75,
70, 59, and 60%. Despite less than complete fill
rates, there appears to be no administrative con-
straint that reduces market access. Permits are free
for the asking and no application is required. Fur-
ther, access to the TRQs is on a first-come, first-
served basis. The explanation would appear to be
that imports of wheat, barley, and barley products
are often not profitable, particularly for wheat and
barley grain, given the competitiveness of Cana-
dian grain production and processing.
Lessons Learned from the Canadian TRQ System
In terms of fill rates, the Canadian record is rela-
tively good. Most categories are filled or nearly so.
When categories have low fill rates, it appears
most often to be due to the importation being un-
profitable. Further, the rules and procedures for
these TRQs appear to be transparent and not too
difficult to use. In other words, for this criterion,
the Canadian TRQ system appears to be working
as desired. Explaining why fill rates are so high is
a tall order, but some observations can be made.
First, the quotas are usually allocated to private
firms that are independent and do not profit from
domestic production. So there would appear to be
strong incentives for these firms to fill their TRQs
as long as the underlying economics of importation
are attractive. Further, the administration of the
regime is quite open, straightforward, and predict-
able, not burdening importers with large costs.
In terms of quota allocation, the domestic
economy and foreign exporters will gain from al-
locating quotas to those importers who can gener-
ate the highest profits from the quotas. One would
want to see a minimum of regulations restricting
who can gain access to the quota, by enterprise
characteristics or industry sector (e.g., further pro-
cessors, or end-uses). Also, one would want to al-
low new entrants to get into importation readily,
TRQ allocation in the Canadian system has done
little to help accessibility by often relying on allo-
cation to historical importers, Some changes are
now beginning to give more access to newcomers.
The most effective means of meeting an objec-
tive of open access is to allow quotas to be bought
and sold on a permanent basis and for there to be
easy short-term rentals (buying and selling the
quotas for that import year). The advantage of al-
lowing this kind of transferability is that it makes
the initial allocation largely irrelevant for achiev-
ing an efficient quota system. On this score,
Canada has improved its regime by allowing the
quotas to trade in many categories, but further
gains are possible by allowing quotas to be bought
and sold legally within the year or rented readily in
all categories. (This does not apply in those cases
where quotas are not constraining, such as when
they are allocated on a first-come, first-served ba-
sis.) This would be a most effective means of get-
ting quotas into the hands of the most efficient
importers. Then the initial allocation can be done
simply to transfer income to desired groups (e.g.,
further processors), and the initial allocations can
become irrelevant for keeping the regime operating
efficiently. Allocating quotas by auctions becomes
less an issue of efficiency for the regime and more
a question of how to split up the quota rents.
Regarding the objective of keeping the admin-
istration of the quota system efficient, this calls for
keeping costs to the importer of accessing quota as
low as possible, keeping transparency high, and
keeping uncertainty from rule changes, additions,
or interpretations as low as possible. Across the
twenty-one TRQ categories, Canada’s regime ap-
pears reasonably successful in meeting this objec-
tive. There are still many gains from further sim-
plifying quota administration. Some of the poultry
allocations seem particularly good candidates for
further simplification. In fact, it would seem un-
necessary to have any rules governing quota ad-
ministration other than that the quota or permit is
needed to undertake importation, and that the quota
must be used within the quota period, Further gains
in domestic efficiency can be arrived at by some
changes in system design. One example mentioned
above is to allow quota rental (within the year) as
well as permitting the quota to be held permanently
(the property right to be granted the annual import
permits, as for farm marketing quotas). This allows
the flexibility of adjusting your quota holding each
year in case of excess demand or your inability that
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the certainty of knowing you will be receiving your
import quota each year.
It may be desirable to spread the quota rents
more widely than is practiced at present. This
could be achieved by having quota auctions, or for
the government to levy a charge on quota recipi-
ents to receive the quota each year. There are sev-
eral advantages to such charges, but Canada has
not yet gone any distance down this path in its
quota administration.
In terms of more international issues, there is the
question of targeting TRQ supplier countries with
the use of country reserves. Canada does have five
of these (one-fourth of all TRQs), but does not
appear to consider the existence of such reserves a
policy objective. These reserves do not seriously
affect the operation of Canada’s regime, do not
contribute to quota under-fill, and are valuable
only to the recipient exporter. Another issue is the
role of State Trading Enterprises, Canada has only
one case, butter, in which the TRQ is allocated to
the Canadian Dairy Commission. One worry about
such a role for STES is that they may have weaker
incentives to fill the quota. But the evidence in
Canada is that the STE monopoly importer is fully
utilizing its butter TRQ.
Implications for the Next Round
require that TRQ levels are actually imported
where there is a market demand for such imports.
Penalties should be imposed on governments (or
their implementing agencies) for failure to allocate
quotas to importers, allowing them to be guided by
private economics as to how much to import. If the
importer is not an independent private firm (e.g.,
an STE), additional penalties may be necessary to
induce them to import their TRQ import levels,
assuming there is a private demand for those im-
ports.
It is not clear why any additional WTO rules
should be adopted in this area, other than to ensure
meeting privately profitable TRQ levels as dis-
cussed above. From the Canadian experience
above, it would not seem necessary to require
quota allocation to private firms, to disallow allo-
cations to STES, or to require the auctioning of
quotas. Most of these additional rules could con-
tribute to filling TRQs and reducing the economic
cost of quota administration and system operations.
But if we can deal directly with the filling of TRQs
as suggested above, such other rules are either re-
dundant or are primarily matters for domestic
policy.
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